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Ch.3 Thailand’s Snail’s Progress toward Good Environmental Governance 
 
1. Introduction 
The Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) hypothesis holds that environmental quality declines 
during early stages of economic development, but improves in later stages. de Bruyn and Heintz 
(1999) summarizes the underlying causes into five categories: (a) increase in the marginal benefit 
that consumers can derive from a good environment, and their changes in consumption activities 
and preferences; (b) institutional and policy changes; (c) increase in environmental efficiency 
through technological and organizational changes, often backed by increased capital stock; (d) 
structural changes in the economic sector, i.e. from agricultural and industrial sectors to the service 
sector; and (e) international relocation of pollution-intensive industries. 
Early empirical studies, such as Shafik (1994) and Grossman and Krueger (1995), show that 
industrial countries passed through the turning point at per capital income between 
US$ 3,000-10,700 for sulfur dioxide, and between US$ 3,280-9,600 for suspended matters.  
Developing countries can potentially gain advantage of backwardness in environmental policy in 
the early stage of economic development by, for example, obtaining more accurate scientific 
knowledge on the causal relationship between pollutants and environmental impacts and adopting 
less pollution- and resource-intensive technology and production processes than those that 
industrialized countries have developed (O’Conner, 1994). This implies that they can pass through 
the turning point at lower per capital income and avoid the kind of serious pollution that 
industrialized countries had gone through. 
Thailand has enjoyed rapid economic growth since the late 1980s, due first to 
agro-industrialization and then to attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI) for export-oriented 
manufacturing. The share of manufacturing in gross domestic products has been increased as 
manufacturing exports boomed (Figure 3-1). Following the Asian economic crisis the country not 
only increased its overall exports, but also diversified their export economy with regard to 
destination countries (Figure 3-2). Rapid industrialization has caused a variety of environmental 
problems, ranging from loss of forest and aquatic resources, frequent floods and water shortages to 
industrial pollution, illegal dumping and improper treatment of wastes. On the other hand, it has 
caused an increase in per capita income up to US$4,000, the turning point of per capita income 
from degradation to improvement in the EKC hypothesis. 
To protect the environment and local people’s livelihood, a number of social and environmental 
groups have emerged to protest against state projects and industrial plants. Amid an enthusiastic 
democratic movement in the first half of 1990s, the government created democratic institutions and 
institutions for the environment, and gave people the right to involve in protecting the environment.  
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These institutions brought the potential to empower communities, to strengthen alliances among 
protesting groups and with others, and to convince the government to make direct negotiation with 
civil society groups. Yet in many cases the government adopted a cabinet resolution solely in 
response to rising pressures, but did not take it seriously and initiated no concrete follow-up action. 
However, a number of recent events provided some hope for policy changes in recent years. 
The Community Forest Bill was finally approved by parliament in 2007 after more than ten years 
of debates, negotiation and neglect. In 2010 Prime Minister Abhisit made a serious commitment 
and took measures to solve the Map Ta Phut industrial pollution. 
In this chapter, I will review the development and interplay of institutional and social capacity 
for the environment in Thailand to show how the development has gone back and forth. Then I take 
the Community Forest Bill and the Map Ta Phut industrial pollution as cases to show how these 
developments have given influence to the problem solving in action, and to explore why the 
government took different approaches to the two controversial issues in Thailand. 
 
2. Analytical Framework 
The theoretical explanations of the EKC recognize that institutional and policy changes are not 
automatically accompanied by economic growth and increase in per capita income. They then 
implicitly assume that a democratic capitalist state with free elections results in inclusive 
policy-making processes. 
However, this assumption does not hold true in many developing nations for several reasons.  
First, the government does not always guarantee political rights, freedom of opinion, and secret 
ballots (Torras and Boyce, 1998). Second, the election may not reflect changes in the constituents’ 
policy preferences. People may vote for their representatives by their ethnicity rather than political 
agenda (Collier, 2009). In Thailand, those who depend for a living on the informal sector were 
mainly recruited into politics through the vote bank systems of electoral organization, in which 
candidates rely on village heads and other locally influenced people to deliver the people’s votes 
(Phongpaichit and Baker, 2009). Vote buying is a common phenomenon. Third, industrial lobbying 
may exert such a strong influence in the policy-making process of the representative democracy 
that decisions are skewed even if the government obtains accurate information on environmental 
pollution and damages (Aden and Ahn, 1999). Fourth, people may not have any concern about 
environmental degradation and may undervalue environmental risks unless they obtain, understand, 
and share accurate knowledge on environmental pollution and damages in a timely manner. Finally, 
governments can choose centralized, hierarchical, and closed administrative institutions of 
environmental decision-making that do not always meet local environmental needs and ensure 
community rights for environmental assets. 
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To address such deficiencies of the electoral and parliament democracy with regard to 
environmental conservation and sustainable development, social capacity and legal literacy should 
be enhanced. It entails creating a social and political environment that encourages actors to identify 
problems and to develop solutions by themselves, to experience capacity development, and enables 
local people to exercise their power in the public sphere (Evans et al, 2005). 
Community empowerment is the key to social capacity development. It leads to creating social 
space in which the community’s claim can be heard and has impact upon decision-making process. 
It is defined as a process in three phases: (a) building community power to solve problems 
independently, (b) building community power to negotiate cooperation with outside agencies, and 
(c) building community power and network to claim and protect community rights (UNDP 
Thailand, 2003). In Thailand, it is seen as an instrument for people to combat the bias of 
centralization, demand public goods and defend their rights within a wider political arena. 
Social capacity is enhanced in tandem with development of institutional capacity. Institutional 
capacity includes all measures that strengthen governmental structures to meet the demands of 
sustainable development, as well as ones that create these capacities in cooperation with civil 
society. It constitutes an enabling environment where citizens’ can voice their concerns and where 
their claims can be heard and negotiated on, and where interests and alternatives can be balanced in 
a fair and transparent manner (UNDP Thailand, 2003). A higher level of institutional capacity 
provides a solid base for sustainable development capacity, and a higher level of social capacity can 
be a basis for a higher sustainable development capacity within civil society (Table 3-1). 
However, even proponents of environmental conservation may have many different, often 
conflicting views. In a democratic setting, a higher level of social capacity combined with a low 
level of institutional capacity may result in irreconcilable conflicts of interests. 
To find a way out of this dilemma, priorities should be given to help identify ecological 
sustainability as a generalizable interest. By attaching one set of generalizable interests to the sum 
of humanity, basic democratic freedom enables environmental democracy to be a moral priority 
independent of non-global collective identities (Mason, 1999). 
In this regard, to what extent civil society can identify ecological sustainability as a 
generalizable interest and government can create an enabling environment is a key factor in 
evaluating the state of environmental governance in developing nations. 
 
3. Institutional Capacity Building for the Environment 
3.1 1992 Legislations 
Thailand had some legislation for pollution control at the early stage of economic development, 
including the Factory Act 1962, Preserving and Improving Environmental Quality Act 1975 and the 
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Board of Investment’s (BOI) regulation on environmental impact assessment (EIA) in 1981.  
However, these legislations were not effective in addressing the problems of a worsening state of 
the environment. 
His Majesty the King’s speech in 1989 expressed grave concerns about environmental 
degradation in the country and thus encouraged the government and the private sector to take more 
serious action for the preservation of the environment (1). Eventually this led to the identification 
of environmental conservation and quality of life as one of its three national priorities in the 
Seventh National Economic and Social Development Plan under then Prime Minister Anand 
Panyarachun, and passage of the Enhancement and Conservation of National Environmental 
Quality Act 1992 (Environmental Protection Act). The Pollution Control Department (PCD), the 
Office of Environmental Policy and Planning (OEPP) and the Department of Environmental 
Quality Promotion (DEQP) were established under the Ministry of Science, Technology and 
Environment (MOSTE) to be in charge of implementing this Act. It empowered the National 
Environment Board to designate pollution control areas to localities that were affected by pollution 
problems and that such problems might be aggravated to cause health hazards to the public or 
adverse impact on the environment quality so that the government takes tougher measures to 
control pollution. The Factory Act 1962 was also revised so that the Department of Industrial 
Works (DIW) under the Ministry of Industry was empowered to inspect the plants. The Energy 
Conservation Promotion Act was also enacted in order to require large buildings and plants to 
conduct energy audits and to prepare energy conservation plans and to provide financial support for 
their conservation activities. To manage financial support, the Environmental Conservation 
(ENCON) Fund was created under the National Energy Policy Office (NEPO). 
With these legislations, the government increased the budget of three departments under the 
MOSTE, and established two new funds: the Environmental Fund and the Energy Conservation 
Fund. In addition, it concentrated the environmental budget to the MOSTE that was formerly 
dispersed among various government agencies (Figure 3-3). 
These changes in the budget allocation and institutional arrangements helped to implement 
policy measures and actions for managing the environment in severely polluted areas. To manage 
water pollution, for example, PCD acquired the authority to build sewerage and perform on-site 
inspection and sampling of commercial buildings. The OEPP takes charge of checking and 
approving EIAs. 
However, these new environmental institutions were severely hampered from two lines. First, 
EIAs were rarely required, and were not available for inspection by public even if submitted. The 
BOI has rejected few, if any, projects on environmental grounds (Forsyth, 1997). The OEPP also 
approved almost all the EIAs of the government-initiated development projects even without 
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holding public hearing and providing information on the project and possible environmental 
impacts, claiming that the Environmental Protection Act does not require it. This inaction on the 
part of the government angered affected local communities, which led to fierce protests against 
development projects, as seen in the coal-fired power plant projects in Prachuap Khiri Khan 
Province in 1999 and the Thai-Malaysian gas pipeline and separation plant project in Songkhla 
Province in 2002 (Mori, 2003a). 
Second, new institutions generated confusion concerning authority and budget. The Public 
Works Department resisted the budget transfer of sewerage and solid waste management to the 
PCD, causing three years of delay in the budget transfer. The Environmental Protection Act gave 
plant inspection authority to the PCD, but in reality the DIW and Industrial Estate Authority of 
Thailand (IEAT) kept it under their control on the ground that they have authority to give the 
operational license. This rendered it difficult for the PCD to inspect the plants and layout of the 
Samut Prakarn Wastewater Management Project that would treat both industrial and domestic 
wastewater (Mori, 2006). 
 
3.2 The 1997 Constitution 
Widespread corruption among the political elite and party politics, followed by the uprising in 
May 1992 against the military-controlled government, fueled the democratic movement in Thailand 
that gained momentum from the mid-1990s onwards. Urban people called for a more accountable, 
corruption-free political system. 
In response to these movements, the speaker of the House of Representatives initiated to set up 
the Democracy Development Committee in 1994, which finally proposed to revise and amend the 
constitution in order to reform the election system and to eradicate vote buying. The government, 
which was controlled by parties predominantly relying on the rural electorate, established the 
Constitution Drafting Assembly in 1996 that consisted of 99 members being 76 deputies elected by 
citizens of 76 Provinces, and 23 academicians from higher education institutes.  The Asian 
economic crisis pushed both members of parliament and senators to pass the draft and to make it 
effective promptly (Suehiro, 2009). 
With the upsurge of discourse of democratization in Thai society, the 1997 Constitution aimed 
at changing the political structure from a representative democracy towards a more participatory 
democracy (Aphornsuvan, 2007). This change can be seen in several sections of the constitution, 
allowing people to participate in the process of appointment of independent commissions, such as 
the Election Commission, the Administrative Court and the Parliamentary Ombudsman. In the 
same line, it grants local people and communities the right to participate in natural resource 
management and preservation of the quality of environment. Furthermore, it allows people to recall 
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certain members of parliament and ministers and to propose draft bills. 
The 1997 Constitution also holds provisions that are favorable for affected people and 
communities that aim to protect the environment and their livelihoods. Section 56 requires EIAs 
with comments from independent organization prior to the operation when permitting any project 
or activity that may seriously affect the quality of the environment. It also protects people’s right to 
sue a state agency, state enterprise, local government organization or other state authorities to 
perform their duties. Section 58 ensures people’s free access to government information, and 
section 59 to government information, explanation and reasons before permission is given for the 
operation of any project or activity which may affect the quality of the environment, health and 
sanitary conditions, the quality of life or any other material interest concerning people or local 
community. Section 59 also ensures their right to express opinions at public hearings. 
The 1997 Constitution clearly stated that the state shall decentralize powers to localities and 
shall promote local self-government at the provincial level where people express their will to 
establish their provincial self-government (Section 78), mandates plans and process for continual 
development of decentralization (Section 284). To implement these sections, the government 
enacted several laws and regulations in 1999. The Imposition of Plans and Steps for Distribution of 
Power to Local Administrative Organizations Act was enacted to delegate responsibility for more 
service provision to local governments, including infrastructure projects such as roads, public 
utilities and public buildings, and management and conservation of natural resources and 
environment. The Regulations on Local Personnel Administration Act was enacted to allow local 
governments to decide hire and promotion of officials and staff without ad-hoc intervention of the 
central government, with the aim of enhancing deep-rooted loyalty of the officials to mayor (Mori, 
2003b). 
The mechanism for budget/subsidy proposal was changed in 2003 so that local governments 
have a reasonable degree of autonomy in designing service delivery. Most subsidies that had 
previously been tied to specific functions/programs were grouped into sectoral block grants, which 
allow local governments more flexibility. The local revenue was 15% and 13% of the government’s 
total revenue in the fiscal year 2000 and 2001 respectively, but was mandated to increase up to 35% 
in 2006 (2). Local governments are allowed to collect and decide the rate of local taxes, though the 
range of tax and its amount are still restricted. 
The 1997 Constitution also required having laws that enabled local governments to manage, 
preserve and exploit the environment (Section 290). These laws shall constitute the basis for 
decentralized environmental management. 
 
- 7 - 
3.3 Bureaucratic reorganization 
Backed by the World Bank-funded and Chulalongkorn University-made proposal, the Thaksin 
government (2001-2006) adopted a bureaucratic reorganization in 2002 that including the 
establishment of a stronger environmental ministry. The MOSTE was dissolved and the Ministry of 
Natural Resource and Environment (MONRE) was established so that the environmental ministry 
became independent from science and technology ministry. Besides three departments that had 
been previously subsumed under the MOSTE, MONRE took over the Forest Department from the 
Ministry of Agriculture, the Department of Mineral Resources from the Ministry of Industry, and 
newly created departments in charge of ground water resources, marine and coastal resources, and 
greenhouse gas management (3). In addition, the Department of Energy Development and 
Promotion was reorganized to be the Department of Alternative Energy Development and 
Efficiency under the newly established Ministry of Energy and be in charge of development and 
diffusion of renewable energy, as well as energy conservation. 
The reorganization increased the amount of share of budget allocated to MONRE. At the same 
time, budget allocation within the department has been significantly changed. The share of budget 
allocated to the original three departments shrank due to a higher budget allocation to water, 
groundwater and natural park departments (Figure 8-3). This shrink became more apparent in 2004 
when the Thaksin government started the fiscal transfer to local governments through the Central 
Fund and the Revolving Fund instead of through ministerial budget, which resulted in a dramatic 
drop of the budget for the Office of Natural Resource and Environmental Policy and Planning 
(ONREPP). 
However, it needs careful examination to evaluate whether the bureaucratic reorganization and 
change in the budget allocation would change the main philosophy governing forest management 
from exploitation toward conservation. 
 
3.4 The 2007 Constitution 
The 2007 Constitution which was drafted following the 2006 military coup against the Thaksin 
government further acknowledged people’s rights and improved descriptions in favor of informed 
participation to public works in the section 57, though it principally aims to block strong political 
party and leader as Thai Rak Thai (TRT) Party and Thaksin from taking over the government again.  
Section 85 gives the government the obligation to act in compliance with the land use, natural 
resources and environment policies. To avoid confusions as seen in the Thai-Malaysian gas pipeline 
projects, the second paragraph of section 67 bans industrial projects considered "severely harmful" 
until four activities have been undertaken: EIA, health impact assessment (HIA), public hearings 
within the community, and an opinion by an independent expert agency. In addition, it enables 
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people to take legal action to force the government to adhere to the people’s rights. Furthermore, to 
facilitate people’s direct political participation, section 163 reduces the number of signatories 
required to propose a bill to parliament from fifty to twenty thousand, and give obligation for the 
House of Representatives and the Senate to call the representative to state the principles of the bill 
and for the non-standing committee to appoint representatives to be its members by not less than 
one-third. 
 
4. Social Capacity Building for the Environment 
4.1 Emergence of influential non-governmental umbrella organizations 
In the early 1990s, local villagers started protests against state projects such as dams, power 
plants, and state forest concessions and designation of conservation forest areas to community land. 
In the meantime, environmental non-governmental organizations had been established and 
expanded their networks to protest them. The Assembly of the Poor was also established in 1995 as 
an umbrella non-governmental organization that comprises existing groups related to controversial 
dams, forest, slums, state projects, work illness, alternative agriculture and small-scale fisheries, 
covering all the regions of Thailand. It was remarkable in its capacity of mobilizing campaign and 
fighting against exploitation and inequity in a number of social situations and material contexts, 
and of enacting through a range of media a cultural, ideological, and discursive battle over the 
exercise of power. It has initiated several rounds of mass protest rallies in Bangkok since 1996. Its 
ninety-nine days of mass demonstrations in Bangkok in 1997 led to the direct negotiation with the 
government and finally resulted in cabinet resolutions accepting all the Assembly-demanded 122 
grievances and establishing a 1.2 billion baht fund that would be spent to compensate villages that 
were affected by dams and other large development projects. 
This success in both gaining legitimacy and obtaining compensation is attributed to several 
factors (Missingham, 2003). First, the Assembly was faithful to the specific grievances and aims of 
each local stakeholder group that joined the network. It compiled all their grievances of each group 
with the list of demands to the government. In addition, it agreed to a social contract to support the 
petitions of every member group and not withdraw or drop out in the event that its particular 
demands were satisfied.  
Second, the Assembly described the rally as a democratic social movement and appealed 
democratic right as a means of gaining social justice in order to lend legitimacy to the rally. To keep 
the support, it committed to nonviolence among its members. 
Third, the strategic occupation of symbolized place and symbolic actions gained media 
coverage and won media support. Supportive media worked effectively in disseminating 
information about the Assembly to a wider public. With considerable coverage and support in the 
- 9 - 
mass media, the government and high-ranking officials were forced to acknowledge the Assembly’s 
claims, to recognize their legitimacy as a political actor and to make negotiations with them. 
Fourth, the Assembly demonstrated middle-class support for the Assembly to put political 
pressure on the government. 
Fifth, the political consciousness of villagers who joined the collective protests was transformed 
in the process of struggle. Assembly advisors, as well as their invited university lecturers and 
prominent lecturers gave lectures, which enhanced protestors’ capacity to access and interpret 
useful information about state policy, laws, regulations, human rights and official procedure to 
petition and representation. This developed their idea and knowledge to represent, delegate and 
petition their opinions and rights to local and central authorities. 
 
4.2 Backlash amid the economic crisis 
To manage the economic crisis, the Democrat-led coalition that took control of the government 
in November 1997 adopted the IMF-imposed policies that aimed to pursue export-oriented growth. 
It completely turned the stance to the Assembly and rural protesters, attacking their legitimacy, 
rejecting their demands, and canceling many of Chavalit's cabinet resolutions that allow highland 
minority groups to remain in reserved watershed areas if they could prove prior settlement (4). On 
behalf, it set up committees to monitor the problem, but with no concrete action. 
This political environment forced the Assembly of the Poor to take a defensive approach, for its 
members’ resources, including their energy and enthusiasm, were running low. The Assembly fell 
back on the local organizational structure that had always been its foundation, and initiated the 
strategy of a concerted array of local protests. Though large-scale mass rally at the protest sites the 
movement continued to won media coverage, but failed to gain any response from the government. 
On the other hand, the Chuan government (1997-2001) initiated the pilot projects of Local 
Agenda 21 program, with the assistance of Sweden and Japan. The program aimed to make use of 
the newly decentralized system to enhance local government capacity in the environment.  While 
adopting a participatory approach, it centered on urban municipality and depended heavily on 
central government subsidies in its implementation. It did not contribute substantially to enhancing 
social capacity in general (Tonami and Mori, 2007), and did not provide opportunity to have a 
generalizable interest between urban and rural people, though a small number of people who had 
good relation with the mayor might have benefitted from it. 
Frustrated with their failure to obtain compensation, the Assembly changed the strategy to 
demonstrate that their ultimate concern was the environmental value and fishing ecology of the 
Moon River that provided common benefits to the Thai society, rather than compensation that could 
be considered as selfish interest (Missingham, 2003). It gave up the petition for compensation and 
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called for decommissioning of the dams, or at least to open the gates during the rainy season when 
the fish migrate. Some Bangkok-based organizations, such as the Confederation for Democracy, 
students groups, and senators-elect welcomed this change and joined the rally in 2000, proposing 
them to establish a network of different social groups, especially urban middle-class groups to 
shore up their deteriorating image and falling public support. The World Commission on Dam 
(WCD)’s study on the Pak Moon Dam in late 2000 resulted in backing the anti-dam movement’s 
stance by internationally confirming what local people had been claiming and admitting that the 
dam was not economically justifiable. 
In response, the Chuan government ceased its aggressive stance and commissioned a committee. 
The committee called for a four-month sluice gate opening for Pak Moon and Rasi Salai Dams, 
compensation for Sirinthorn Dam villages, postponement and environmental impact assessment of 
the proposed Prong Khun Pet, Lam Dom Yai and Hua Na Dam projects, and issuance of land 
ownership certificates for villagers in reserved forests and National Parks (5). To abide by the 
recommendation, the government announced that it would open all sluice gates on the Rasi Salai 
Dam for two years, but made no other commitment. 
 
4.3 Fallout and revival 
The deadlock was temporally resolved at the outset of the Thaksin government (2001-2006). To 
win at the general election in 2001, as well as to defend himself against being forced to step down 
by the Constitutional Court, Thaksin cultivated populist support from various kinds of groups. He 
held a luncheon for leaders of the Assembly of the Poor, which had carried out large 
demonstrations in Bangkok with people demanding that the Pak Moon Dam floodgates be opened. 
He also visited the sites of conflict over environment: the two coal-fired thermal power plant 
projects in Prachuap Khiri Khan Province, and the pipeline project in Songkhla Province. 
In response, the Assembly publicly announced that they would mount a campaign and gather 
signatures to support calls for pardon should he be found guilty. After the frustrated Assembly’s 
long march and protests in 2001, Thaksin put pressure on prosecutors to drop charges against the 
Assembly members, and made a cabinet resolution for a four-month opening of the dam gates in 
2001. He finally made the cabinet resolution in 2004 to open the dam's sluice gates for four months 
starting from May each year, balancing fish migration season and electricity demand. 
However, the social capacity has been seriously hampered by Thaksin’s change in political style.  
After he had avoided to be forced to step down at the Constitutional Court, he started to offer 
himself as the vehicle through which the wishes of the people could be transformed into action on 
the part of the government. He quickly implemented the three point electoral programs of 30 baht 
health care, agrarian debt relief and village funds, which met the exact demands of poor villagers 
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after the economic crisis. To secure his electoral support for the 2005 election, he made a series of 
tours and gave instant approval for projects, using vastly expanded central fund under his own 
control which he had created by reform in the budget process (Phongpaichit and Baker, 2009). On 
the other hand, he avoided arrangements with civil society organizations (CBOs) that might place 
him under some obligation to deliver against his promises. He also devalued the importance of 
parliament and neutralized the checks-and-balance bodies of the 1997 constitution. Both CBOs and 
parliament gradually lost the function of intermediary between the people and the state, and their 
presence at public space where discourses are created. 
 
4.4 Disbanded solidarity among social organizations 
The Democrat-led Chuan government successfully made the middle class distrust the villagers.  
Middle-class people, especially Bangkokians regarded the Assembly of the Poor as paid mob, 
manipulated by opposition parties to oust the government, or that its NGO advisers were funding 
by foreigners wanting to interfere in Thailand’s internal politics (6), and took them as opportunists. 
Thaksin’s policies as well as his political style threatened the privileged position of the Thai 
business elite and middle class in setting political agenda. They felt anxious about empowerment of 
rural mass under the Thaksin period. They supported the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD)’s 
anti-Thaksin demonstration and even supported the coup in the expectation of restoring their 
political influence. Divide and distrust between the middle-class and the villagers and informal 
mass became serious during the Thaksin administration. 
After Thaksin had been ousted, fierce conflict arose between pro-Thaksin and anti-Thaksin 
groups within the central politics as well as society in general. The Democratic Party and other 
anti-Thaksin parties gained votes from urban middle class and Southern provinces, but failed to win 
the first general election under the 2007 Constitution. The People's Power Party, most of whose 
parliament members originally hailed from the Thai Rak Thai Party, getting votes from North and 
Northeast provinces, won the election. This signified a deepening and increasingly irreconcilable 
divide between urban middle class and the rural poor. 
Moreover, this magnified the division among the poor and marginalized people. Pro-Thaksin 
group felt empowered by the Thai Rak Thai scheme, partly through the very impact of the 
programmes, partly through the impression that Thaksin and his party were responsive to their 
demands, and partly because the scheme positioned each citizen in an equal and direct relationship 
with the state (Phongpaichit and Baker, 2009). Many CBOs felt betrayed by Thaksin’s commitment 
in the election campaign in 2000, becoming hostile to him and joined in anti-Thaksin groups. They 
joined mass non-violence rally initiated by the People’s Alliance for Democracy that led to 
two-months occupation of the airports and stepping down of the Somchai government (2008). The 
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Democrats-led coalition took over the government, but the United Front for Democracy Against 
Dictatorship (UDD), an alliance of pro-Thaksin groups, launched a mass rally, which led to clashes 
with security force. As the battle became fierce, increasing number of the groups lost their interest 
in the environment and in ecological issues, and left the umbrella NGOs such as the Assembly of 
the Poor to join either of the two groups. Once-existed unity and common interest among the poor 
was almost lost, which posed a major obstacle to their battle over institutions for environment and 
their livelihood (7). 
 
5. How Does Capacity Development Affect Controversial Environmental Conflicts? 
What impacts have changes in institutional and social capacity had in solving environmental 
conflicts? How have rising environmental conflicts changed environmental governance in 
Thailand? This section takes the three controversial environmental disputes to examine these 
changes and impacts. 
 
5.1 The Thai-Malaysian gas pipeline and separation plant project 
Villagers adjacent to the Thai-Malaysian gas pipeline and separation plant project reinforced 
their resistance against the prime minister’s decision that the gas pipeline project would go ahead 
over a new route. They pointed to violations of the 1997 Constitution, including the government’s 
signature on the contracts before any public hearings or EIA were conducted. 
However, it took time for the government and politicians to get accustomed to and to adjust the 
existing institutions to the completely new constitution (Mori, 2005). A public hearing was held in 
2000, but it turned into violence because police blocked protesters from entering into the hearing, 
and the committee ended the hearing within 15 minutes with full support from participants (8). In 
2001, the OEPP suddenly approved the EIA report in 2001 despite its eight-time rejection for the 
lack of comprehensive plans to tackle social impacts, disregarding the independent expert panel’s 
rejection on the study of adverse social impacts and the mitigation measures for distorting facts.  
The OEPP was accused of approving the EIA only to help the project meet the contract deadline (9).  
After all, the government started construction in 2004. 
The government’s disregard of environmental and social impacts continued in the construction 
period. The government stripped the land of its waqf status, paving the way for it to be turned into a 
construction site against the will of the local villagers (10). This has deepened their distrust of the 
government, leading to continuous protests against developments project around the country. 
 
5.2 Community Forest Bill 
The death of 350 people in the flash floods in Southern Thailand in 1988 incited the 
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government to ban logging throughout Thailand from 1989 onwards. Yet the logging ban merely 
replaced logging by illegal imports, commercial plantations and tourism development due to 
increasing demand for construction materials under rapid urbanization and for tourism. The 
government had previously announced the national forestry policy in 1985, which calls for 25% of 
the country's total land area to be conservation forest composed of national parks, wildlife 
sanctuaries, Class 1A watersheds, and environmental protection areas. In the name of protecting 
forest coverage, the Forest Department granted concessions to private company to invest in 
commercial plantation, and hotels and other facilities in the designated national parks, both of 
which would reap higher revenues for the department. In the process, the Forest Department 
disregarded local people’s traditional entitlement over community-managed land. This raised 
massive protests by farmers, especially ethnic minorities, which raised concern of the Ministry of 
Interior that pursued control over forest dwellers (Ganjanapan, 1997). Farmers, especially ethnic 
minorities in highland areas, were often thrown into jail for farming in national forest or even 
merely gathering non-timber forest products as usual, resulting in forced relocation for illegal 
encroachment. This has made them lose their livelihood, and accelerated marginalization. 
When the 1997 Constitution was enacted, Northern NGOs collected the signatures of over 
50,000 eligible voters, proposing their Community Forest Bill to the legislature, and asking it to be 
passed. However, the Forest Department was dead set against community management, and it 
produced a bill of its own that provided for rehabilitating degraded land under its own management 
and reforestation under state control. The debate on these points led to public hearings throughout 
the country, changes in the bill, and finally cabinet approval. With significant change in the text, 
especially addition of the description that carries a maximum 15-year jail term and a maximum fine 
of 300,000 baht for encroachment on forest reserves, illegal logging, poaching, the House of 
Representatives passed the bill in 2001 (11). But the Senate changed substantive articles to prohibit 
human settlements in protected forests, fearing the bill would encourage encroachment. It was then 
delayed after the Senate's term expired. 
The Community Forest Bill was finally approved by the interim Thai parliament in 2007, ten 
years after the villagers’ long march to push for the adoption of a people's version of the bill. 
Regardless of the 2007 Constitution, the Act limits community rights to original forest dwellers 
with strict guidelines for the use of protected forest, though it accepts the legal right of 
communities to preserve and manage forestland surrounding their communities.  This resulted in 
exclusion of about 20,000 communities scattered on the rim of protected forests countrywide 
because it limits eligibility to original dwellers to those who have lived in the forest for at least 10 
years before the bill is promulgated (12). It also prohibits logging in protected community forest, 
despite a community having access to the resources within a protected area. 
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However, this bill has not been ratified yet. The National Legislative Assembly members 
recognized that the law suppresses community rather than benefit them and submitted a petition to 
the Constitutional Court to examine whether the law is in conflict with articles 66 and 67 of the 
new 2007 Constitution, (13). This has prevented the parliament to ratify the bill (Fisher, 2009). 
 
5.3 Industrial Pollution at Map Ta Phut 
Followed by the success in natural gas exploitation at Gulf of Thailand, the Map Ta Phut 
Industrial Estate was created as a part of the Eastern Seaboard Development Program that was 
initiated in the Fifth National Economic and Social Development Plan (1981-1984). It began with a 
total area of 672 hectares, but with the booming of petrochemical industry, expanded to 1,200 
hectares. In addition, another two private industrial estates were located next to the Map Ta Phut 
Industrial Estate, with a total area of 488 hectares. More than ninety industrial plants are located in 
these three estates, consisting of oil refinery, petrochemical, chemical, fertilizer, steel and iron. 
Hazardous waste treatment and disposal was discovered in 1999 due to frequent illegal dumping 
and fierce protests against its location nearby farmland. 
As soon as several plants started operation, people suffered from various kinds of pollution, 
especially air and water pollution, and odor. They caused health damages, which led to 
hospitalization of a great number of teachers and students of the Map Ta Phut Pittayakarn School in 
1997 and 1998. The rates of diseases related to respiratory system, nervous system, reproductive 
system, muscle system and metal disorder have reached an alarming level and cases of leukemia 
have increased. Exposure to volatile organic compounds (VOCs) such as benzene, styrene and 
xylene were suspected as a cause of these diseases (Tera et al, 2005). 
However, the government took no other action than the relocation of Map Ta Phut Pittayakarn 
School and Map Ta Phut hospital. Although PCD admitted that some serious pollution incidents 
had occurred, IEAT and DIW kept assuming that there was no routine pollution. The National 
Environment Committee (NEC) also turned down the proposal to designate Map Ta Phut as a 
pollution control zone on the ground it would hurt investment climate. Residents were still forced 
to suffer from various health damages. 
In order to prove routine pollution, environmental NGOs, with support from Global Comunity 
Monitor, initiated an environmental monitoring project to focus on gathering evidence of 
widespread toxic exposure by industrial air pollution in 2003. They employed a simplified 
sampling method that had been verified as a credible method for air sampling by US EPA. 
Five-point, five-month sampling identified a total of twenty different toxic chemicals as a source of 
air pollution, detected at least six and up to twelve VOCs and sulphur compounds in each sample, 
and proved at least two toxic chemicals in the samples were in excess of one or more health 
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protective standards or US EPA annual ambient standards (Buakamsri et al, 2005). A Rangsit 
University survey also found that water sources in 25 communities around the industrial estate were 
seriously contaminated by heavy metals (14). 
Residents and NGOs stepped up their protests when new large-size coal-fired power plants had 
started operation, and the government approved additional eighteen petrochemical plant locations 
in the industrial estate. They criticized industries of discharging emissions beyond carrying capacity 
even under the condition that each plant complied with emission standards, and demanded the 
designation of a pollution control area. 
This protest, together with the approval of Prime Minister Surayud (2006-2008) to tackle the 
environmental problems, prompted the government to take serious action. The NEB set up a 
sub-panel to study the health impact, and requested the PCD to set emission standards for nine 
VOCs and to impose its compliance as a condition to permit plant expansion and location. But it 
failed because no plant could comply with it, which would threaten industrial location. Instead, 
NEB drew up a five-year action plan for environmental management with fifty-eight environmental 
management projects in 2007. In addition, the IEAT and the DIW secured a budget for installing 
pollution monitoring equipment and for setting up set up a pollution auditing and monitoring centre. 
These actions stopped leaks of VOCs at 92 of 100 points in the production process, reduced 
nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions by 6,600 tons against a target of 2,879 tons per year, and sulphur 
dioxide (SO2) by nearly 7,000 tons against a target of 9,920 tons (15). For areas outside Map Ta 
Phut, 226 VOC leak points have been fixed from a total of 272, though reduction of NOx and SO2 
emissions was much less against the target. 
However, these reductions have not fundamentally resolved the problem. The PCD has initiated 
Pollutant Release and Transfer Registers (PRTR) project since 2008 because Industrial Ministry has 
not disclosed a list of the chemicals factories use and the level of pollutants they emit.  Still, the 
PCD obtained little, if any information because the project is conducted on voluntary rather than 
mandatory basis (16). 
Taking advantage of democratic institutions created under the 1997 Constitution, residents filed 
a complaint with the provincial administrative court against the Industry Minister and the NEB for 
failing to declare Map Ta Phut a pollution control area. The Provincial Administrative Court 
ordered the NEB to declare the Map Ta Phut areas a pollution control area, which led to its 
declaration in May 2009. In response, local administrative organizations in the Map Ta Phut area 
completed drafting of a pollution reduction plan that consisted of wastewater and air pollution 
treatment projects, creation of "green zones" and strengthening local environmental protection and 
pollution monitoring networks to obtain budget from MONRE and Industrial Ministry (17). 
Another local NGO filed a complaint with the administrative court for suspending the operating 
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permits of 76 industrial projects, including 14 projects that have been granted government permits 
to continue construction. Citing NEB’s decision to declare pollution control area, the Central 
Administrative Court ordered the suspension of operating permits for 76 industrial projects for 
ministries’ negligence to pass the necessary implementation laws required by Section 67 of the 
2007 Constitution, such as legal framework of HIA and independent expert agency. The Ministry of 
Industry soon appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court, which ruled that 11 of 76 projects 
frozen by a lower court injunction because of pollution concerns could proceed. To promulgate 
implementation laws on HIA and independent expert agency, the government set up a four-party 
panel consisting of the government, business, academics and community representatives headed by 
former Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun. The panel proposed that 18 harmful activities would be 
subject to both EIA and HIA in the environmentally sensitive areas, but the NEB shortened the list 
of harmful activities to 11 and approved it, saying that government's priority was not the list but a 
study into buffer zones and the level of toxic discharge absorption in local communities (18). This 
shortened list led to the Central Administrative Court’s ruling to allow 74 earlier-suspended projects 
to go ahead while it ordered the termination of the operating permits of other two projects, 
requiring operators to implement both EIA and HIA. 
Residents were extremely dissatisfied with this ruling and prepared a massive rally urging to 
back the list of harmful activities to 18, which had been proposed by the four-party panel, and an 
appeal with the Supreme Administrative Court, asking for its overturn. 
 
5.4 Impacts on the institutional and social capacity 
These cases suggest that institutional capacity has not been enhanced in tandem with social 
capacity development once the enthusiasm for seeking democracy had been cooled down. On the 
one hand, the emergence of a middle class has rendered little, if any to obtain wider support for 
turning the ecological crisis into an issue of generalized interest across classes. On the other hand, 
the business and political elite put pressure to the government so that they could take advantage of 
the environmental movement to expand their vested interests while avoid solving the root causes of 
its environmental problems that contradicted with their interests. The Community Forest Bill that 
was adopted by the Thai interim parliament in 2007 aimed primarily at recovering ecological 
benefits—the benefits that ecologically minded elite and middle class gain at the expense of local 
communities’ traditional entitlement over natural resources, and thus their sustainable livelihoods. 
There is little, if any policy measures to deal with the root cause of deforestation. The ruling of the 
Central Administrative Court on the Map Ta Phut case forced the government to list up harmful 
activities that would be subject to both EIA and HIA in the environmentally sensitive areas, but the 
government succeeded in convincing the Central Administrative Court to set ruling in favor of them. 
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In addition, it has accelerated development projects in neighboring countries, including hydro-dams, 
coal-fired power plants, gas pipelines and industrial estates.  This is in consistent with the interests 
of business elites and middle class in expanding their business while avoiding environmental 
disputes, but at the expense of livelihoods and ecological crisis there. 
This implies that Thailand has paved a way from the “lower institutional and social capacities” 
to “higher social capacity while keeping institutional capacity low” in the Table 8-1. Despite of the 
ruling of the Central Administrative Court on the Map Ta Phut case, the government does not dare 
to revise any basic environmental laws and regulations, including the Enhancement and 
Conservation of National Environmental Quality Act 1992 and the Factory Act 1992. The Abhisit 
government took further commitments, checking 200 factories that fell on the list of 11 harmful 
activities and were granted operating permits before the 2007 Constitution took effect, pushing 
industrial operators to develop a buffer zone around factories, and ordering ten projects that fall 
into 11 projects but were not subject to 76 earlier-suspended projects to complete EIA and HIA 




This chapter employs a framework for interaction between social and institutional capacity and 
evaluate the development of social and institutional capacity in Thailand.  Main findings can be 
summarized as follows.  First, democratic institutions have been developed amid the enthusiasm 
for seeking democracy and created public space for the poor and the marginalized people to voice 
their concerns, which have enhanced social capacity for good governance. Second, stronger 
political influence of business and political elite after the democratization has blocked further 
enhancement of institutional capacity, which made the government avoid solving the root causes of 
its environmental problems wherever it contradicted with their interests.  Third, combination of 
higher social capacity and lower institutional capacity has generated social division, making it 
extremely difficult to obtain wider support for turning the ecological crisis into an issue of 
generalized interest across classes. Finally, Thailand’s recent accelerated development in 
neighbouring countries generates ecological and social crisis there and poses a challenge of how to 




1. “A national disgrace we cannot ignore,” Bangkok Post December 13, 2003. 
2. This share has never been reached at last. 
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3. The Forest Department was divided into the Department of National Park, Wildlife, Plant 
Conservation and the Forest Department, for Senate voted to move the agencies that administer 
conservation to the new ministry while keeping those dealing with exploitation under the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Cooperatives. 
4. The government revoked the Chavalit cabinet’s resolution to compensate villagers adversely 
affected by dams and ruled out any further retrospective compensation for dam construction. It 
approved the controversial construction of Kaeng Suea Ten dam and resurrected the Prong Khun 
Pet dam projects. In 1999, it set out to discredit the Rasi Salai villagers and let police charge leaders 
and groups (Missingham, 2003). 
5. “Government gives way to most protester demands,” Bangkok Post, July 26, 2000. 
6. See, for example, Supara Janchitfah, “City folks must share blame over dam crisis,” Bangkok 
Post August 13, 2000. 
7. Sirikul Bunnag, “Divisions impoverish Assembly of the Poor” Bangkok Post December 14, 
2010. 
8. Ploenpote Atthakor and Vichayant Boonchote, “Mob rampages as panel approves B28bn 
project,” Bangkok Post, October 22, 2000. 
9. Anchalee Kongrut, “OEPP under heavy fire for EIA approval,” Bangkok Post, December 8, 
2001. 
10. “Islamic office urged to put a halt to project,” Bangkok Post, January 19, 2008. 
11. “Community Forest Bill gets approval,” Bangkok Post, November 9, 2001. 
12. Apinya Wipatayotin, “Community Forest Bill passed,” Bangkok Post, November 22, 2007. 
13. Supara Janchitfah, “Flaws in the Forestry Bill,” Bangkok Post, February 3, 2008. 
14. Apinya Wipatayotin, “Map Ta Phut water unfit for home use,” Bangkok Post January 23, 2007. 
15. Yuthana Praiwan, “PTT plans to invest B10bn to help turn Map Ta Phut green,” Bangkok Post 
May 24, 2007, and Aranee Jaiimsin, “Map Ta Phut industrial estate beats targets,” Bangkok Post 
December 20, 2007. 
16. Apinya Wipatayotin, “Pollutants in Rayong to be made public,” Bangkok Post November 8, 
2008. 
17. Apinya Wipatayotin, “Map Ta Phut pollution proposal drafted,” Bangkok Post May 9, 2010. 
18. Apinya Wipatayotin and Manop Thip-Osod, “Abhisit 'clears the air' over Map Ta Phut 
impasse,” Bangkok Post September 15, 2010. 
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Figure 3-1 Industrial Structure and FDI in Thailand 
 Source: Asian Development Bank, Key Indicators for Asia and Pacific, each year. 
 
Figure 3-2 Export Values in Thailand by Destination 
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 Figure 3-3 Government Environmental Expenditure in Thailand 
 Source: Statistical Yearbook of Thailand, each year. 
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Share of Government Budget
Period Name Affliation
1992 Anand Panyarachun
1992-95 Chuan Leekpai (1) Democratic Party
1995-96 Banharn Silpaarcha Thai Nation Party
1996-97 Chavalit Yongchaiyudh New Aspiration Party
1997-2001 Chuan Leekpai (2) Democratic Party
2001-2006 Thaksin Shinawatra Thai Rak Thai Party
2006-2008 Surayud Chulanont Military
2008 Samak Sundaravej People Power Party
2008 Somchai Wongsawat People Power Party
2008-2011 Abhisit Vejjajiva Democratic Party
2011- Yingluck Shinawatra Pheu Thai Party
